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Gould: Access to Public Lands Across Intervening Private Lands

COMMENT
ACCESS TO PUBLIC LANDS ACROSS
INTERVENING PRIVATE LANDS
INTRODUCTION

An increased population 1 and a rise in disposable income'
have combined to create a dramatic increase in outdoor recreation since the end of World War II.' In addition to increased
participation in activities commonly engaged in prior to 1945,
the post-war period has seen the growth of a plethora of activities rarely practiced or completely nonexistent in preceding years. The hunter and fisherman now finds that he must
compete with the snowmobiler, backpacker, mountain climber,
and cross-country skier for recreational space.
Vast amounts of public lands,' primarily in the western
states,' exist to satisfy the demand for a place in which to
conduct these activities. As a matter of public policy, over
90% of the public domain is open to recreational use.' However, large areas are not open, in fact.7 In a number of instances public lands are unavailable to recreationalists be1. In 1945 the population of the United States was 140,468,000; in 1970 it was
204,800,000. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1971 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 5 (92nd annual ed.).
2. Disposable personal income has risen from $206.9 billion in 1950 to $684.8
billion in 1970. Id. at 310.
3. The following figures serve to emphasize the increase in outdoor recreation.
In 1920 visits to national parks totaled 1 million, in 1964 102 million; visits
to state parks increased from 69 million to 285 million between 1942 and
1962, CLAWSON & KNETSCH, ECONOMICS OF OUTDOOR RECREATION 6 (1966).

4. Of the 2,271,343,000 acres comprising the United States 761,301,000 acres,
or 33.501, are federally owned. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at
189.
5. About one half of the public lands are in Alaska. Ninety percent of the
remaining one half are in the 11 western states. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 22 (1970).

6. Id. at 214.
7. Id. The following figures may give some appreciation of the magnitude of
the problem. A 1959 Colorado study concluded that 1.5 million acres of
public land, including 1 million acres of National Forest lands, were blocked
to free public access. A 1959 Oregon study concluded 500,000 acres of valuable hunting and fishing lands were inaccessible in Oregon. In the same
year the Bureau of Land Management estimated that 12.4 million acres of
BLM land lacked physical access (could not be easily reached by existing
roads and trails) and 5.4 million acres were closed off by private lands. U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,

PUBLIC ACCESS TO PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS

5

(Eco-

nomic Research Service Miscellaneous Publication No. 1122 1968).
Copyright@ 1973 by the University of Wyoming
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cause the only practical access route transverses privately
owned land, and permission to cross this land is denied. As a
number of recent magazine articles8 attest, this problem is
by no means minor.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the legal rights
of one facing this problem. In short, the question to be examined is: Does a member of the public have a legal right to cross
private land in order to reach the public domain ? In seeking
an answer to this question, no attempt to examine the equities
of the public and the land owner will be made. Rather this
article will confine itself to an examination of statutory and
common law remedies to determine if such a right presently
exists.
The roots of this problem can be found in earlier attitudes
of the United States with respect to its lands. Until the latter
part of the 19th Century disposal of public lands was the prevailing policy.' Disposal was accomplished through various
programs including pre-emption acts, homestead acts and
grants to railroads and states.1" Since no retention of land
was envisioned it was unnecessary to provide in these programs
for access to the remaining public lands.
In 1872 the first major deviation from the disposal philosophy was manifested by the creation of Yellowstone National
Park.1" In 1891 Congress gave the President the power to reserve forest lands12 and substantial amounts of land were set
aside under this authority." By 1934 land acquisitions by private persons had dwindled significantly, 4 there being little
suitable land left to take. In that year the Taylor Grazing
Act" was passed, providing for the management of the remain8. E.g., Frome, The Big Lockout, Field and Stream, Oct. 1971, at 58; O'Hearne,
An Iron Curtain Across the West, Sports Illustrated, Nov. 6, 1961, at 66.
9. See CLAWSON & HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS 17-36 (1957).

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

A graph showing

the highlights of public land law can be found in THE PUBLIC LANDS 484
(Carstensen ed. 1963).
A good discussion of the various land disposal laws can be found in GATES,
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT chs. 6-18 (1968).
Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32-33.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103.
See GATES, supra note 10, at 567, 579-580; CLAWSON & HELD, supra note 9,
at 28.
CLAWSON & HEM, supra note 9, at 33.
Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269-75.
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ing public lands by the Department of Interior. Executive
Order 6910 of November 26, 1934 and Executive Order 6964
of February 5, 1935 withdrew all unappropriated public
lands, except those in Alaska, pending classification by the
Secretary of the Interior. Since that time disposal has been
discretionary with the Secretary." These Orders ended, for
practical purposes, the disposal of public lands and fixed the
basic public-private ownership pattern.
Most of the disposal programs left selection of the land to
the individual. The obvious result was that the most desirable
lands were selected, leaving the less desirable lands untaken.
Ultimately the untaken lands were withdrawn by the United
States, becoming what is presently the public domain. Since
Mother Nature has not seen fit to arrange desirable and undesixable lands in any rational pattern it was inevitable that
certain public lands would be left with no means of access.
Furthermore, even those programs which gave the grantee
little choice, such as the railroad grants, were not designed
with access to the remaining public lands in mind. The access
problem is one of the many legacies of these haphazard programs of disposal and withdrawal.
Before proceeding it might be useful to clarify the physical situations of primary concern. The most obvious situation
is that in which public lands are completely surrounded by
private lands, across which there is no public road. In a less
extreme situation one or more public roads may reach the
public lands, but a portion of it may remain inaccessible as a
practical matter because of remoteness or physical barriers.
In such a situation it may be desirable to cross private land
if the otherwise inaccessible portion can be more easily reached
by so doing. In a somewhat distinct category are checkerboard
lands. This pattern of ownership is a result of grants to railroads of all the odd-numbered sections within a given distance
of the railroad right-of-way as incentive and reward for the
construction of the lines. The problems associated with these
lands will become evident during the course of this comment.
It is worthy of note that the Bureau of Land Management
16. Taylor Grazing Act, § 7, ch. 865, § 7, 48 Stat. 1272 (1934), as amended 43
U.S.C. § 315f (1970). See 43 .F.R. § 2400.0-3 (1972).
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has concluded that as a practical matter nearly all checkerboard lands are closed to the public."
TIE UNLAWFUL ENCLOSURE OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT

The problem of access to public land is not a new one. By
1885 western cattle barons had succeeded in enclosing millions
of acres of public domain." To remedy this evil Congress enacted legislation known popularly as the "Unlawful Enclosure
of Public Lands Act" 9 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
The four Sections of the Act which are of primary interest
to this discussion are digested below.
Section one2" provides that all enclosures of public lands
by any person having no claim or color of title are unlawful,
and maintenance, construction, or control of such an enclosure
is likewise unlawful. This section also prohibits the assertion
of the right of exclusive use without claim or color of title.
Section two2 charges the United States Attorney for the
proper district with the responsibility of bringing a civil suit
upon the filing of an affidavit by a citizen. The United States
District Courts are given jurisdiction, are ordered to give
preference to the case over all other civil cases, to restrain
violations by injunctions, and to order the destruction of enclosures not removed within five days.
Section three2 makes it illegal by force, threat, intimidation, fencing, or otherlawful means, to prevent or obstruct a
person from peaceably entering upon public land. It also prevents the obstruction of free passage over public lands.
Section four"3 makes it a misdemeanor to violate the Act
with a maximum penalty of a $1,000.00 fine, one year imprisonment, or both.
17. U.S.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 7.
One Senator estimated 15,000,000 acres were illegally fenced. 15 CONG. REC.
4771 (1884) (remarks of Senator Payson).
Act of Feb. 25, 1885, ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321-22, as amended 43 U.S.C. §§ 106166 (1970).
43 U.S.C. § 1061 (1970).
Id. § 1062.
Id. § 1063.
Id. § 1064.
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The question of significance here is whether the Act requires that a private land owner grant the public the right to
cross his land to reach the public domain. Any attempt to
answer this question requires an examination of Camfield v.
United States.2 4
Like many cases concerning the Act, Can'ifield involved
checkerboard lands. The defendant was the owner of all the
odd-numbered sections in two contiguous townships. In addition, he owned all the odd-numbered sections immediately adjacent to the boundary of these townships. By an ingenious
method, illustrated below, the defendant was able to completely fence off the two townships without placing any fence
on the publicly owned even-numbered sections, thus, giving
himself exclusive control of his own land plus some 36 sections
of public land.
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The defendant asserted that the Act did not apply to
fences built on private land. He further contended that if it
did apply it was unconstitutional. In rejecting the first contention the United States Supreme Court said:
If the act be construed as applying only to fences actually erected upon public lands, it was manifestly
unnecessary, since the Government as an ordinary
proprietor would have the right to prosecute for trespass. It is only by treating it as prohibiting all
"enclosures" of public lands, by whatever means,
that the act becomes of any avail.2"
The Court answered the constitutional question by typifying
the fence as a nuisance which Congress had the power to abate.
Subsequent decisions by lower courts have applied the Act
to fences erected on private lands where the enclosure itself
was not complete, but was joined with natural barriers so
that access was prohibited as a practical matter ;26 where openings were left but the court did not feel they were adequate ;",
and where the fence was joined with those of another person
to complete the enclosure.2" However, the Act has been held to
be inapplicable when only one person was denied access because the fence separates his land from the public domain.2"
The Camfield opinion is ambiguous as to whether intent
to enclose public land is an element of the offense and has been
25. Id. at 525. The Supreme Court was in error both as to the reason for the
Act and the need for it. The following remark is typical of much of the
debate concerning the Act.
"The letter which has been read at the Clerk's desk shows, as well
as numerous documents and letters in the papers which I hold in
my hand and to which I have referred, that so soon as these gentlemen fenced in these lands they proceed at once to destroy the
evidence of the survey. Government monuments are leveled to
the ground; Government stakes are pulled up, and after an enclosure is fenced I am satisfied at the Interior Department there
is no evidence the land was ever surveyed. And, therefore, as
lawyers within the sound of my voice will appreciate, it is impossible
to describe upon paper the precise tract of land which is included.
The locus cannot be described and therefore the United States is
without remedy."
15 CONG. REC. 4772 (1884) (remarks of Senator Payson).
26. Stoddard v. United States, 214 F. 566 (8th Cir. 1914); Golconda Cattle Co.
v. United States, 201 F. 281 (9th Cir. 1912); Rev'd on other grounds on
rehearing, 214 F. 903 (9th Cir. 1914); Thomas v. United States, 136 F.
159 (9th Cir. 1905).
27. Golconda Cattle Co. v. United States, 201 F. 281 (9th Cir. 1912).
28. Thomas v. United States, supra note 26.
29. Callison v. Ronstadt, 188 P. 266 (Ariz. 1920); Anthony Wilkinson Livestock
Co. v. McIlquam, 14 Wyo. 209, 83 P. 864 (1905).
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cited as authority for both sides of the proposition. The 8th
Circuit, relying on the language previously quoted from Camfield, has taken the position that any enclosure which causes
a practical denial of access is unlawful regardless of the intent
of the builder."0 A similar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of Utah in a decision handed down 5 years before
the Camfield decision."
On the other hand, the Court conceded in Camfield that
the defendant could lawfully have enclosed each odd-numbered section separately, thereby excluding the public from the
even-numbered sections. The Court then stated:
"[B]ut when, under the guise of enclosing his own
land, he builds a fence which is useless for that purpose, and can only have been intended to enclose the
lands of the Government, he is plainly within the
statute, .... .,82
This language led the 9th Circuit to conclude that intent is a
necessary element of the offense.8
One opinion appears to resolve the issue in the following
manner: If the fence is ineffectual for enclosing one's own
land intent is conclusively presumed, but where the fence is
effective for that purpose such a fence is lawful unless built
solely with the intent of preventing access to public lands. 4
It is doubtful that this analysis reconciles all the cases, but
perhaps it resolves the inconsistencies within the Camfield
opinion.
The Supreme Court did not even discuss whether the Act
conferred any right to cross private lands in the Camfield decision. While this may seem somewhat surprising at first
glance, it is less startling when one realizes that the desired
solution to the case did not require a resolution of that issue.
The case arose in Colorado which had a statute requiring a
landowner to have a legal fence before he could recover for
Homer v. United States, 185 F. 741 (8th Cir. 1911).
United States v. Buford, 8 Utah 178, 30 P. 433 (1892).
Camnfield v. United States, supra note 24, at 528.
Golconda Cattle Co. v. United States, 214 F. 903 (9th Cir. 1914); Lillis v.
United States, 190 F. 530 (9th Cir. 1911) ; Potts v. United States, 114 F.
52 (9th Cir. 1902).
84. United States v. Rindge, 208 F. 611, 623-24 (S.D. Cal. 1913).
30.
31.
32.
33.
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trespass of another person's cattle. Thus, by removing the
fence the Supreme Court also eliminated a basic element of
any legal action to prevent the public from using the land for
the only purpose desired: pasturing cattle.
Two state courts had occasion to consider the problem
prior to the Camfield decision. The Supreme Court of Wyoming in considering the constitutionality of the Act as it related to fences on private lands made a very cogent appraisal
of the real problem.
Is it the law or the fence which secures to the owner
of property its exclusive enjoyment?. The fence is
The
made for beasts; the law is made for man ....
fence destroyed, what greater facility of access to
the retained sections will the public then have than
if the fence had remained ?. . . When reduced to its
last and true legal analysis, the point in controversy
is, shall the United States have a way over the defendant's land?3"
Concluding that no such way existed the court held the Act
unconstitutional to the extent it applied to fences on private
land. The Supreme Court of Utah, on the other hand, justified the constitutionality of the Act on the basis that the
United States had retained an implied easement to reach remaining lands when it made the private grants. 6 While they
reached opposite conclusions both courts recognized what
seems to be the essential problem of applying the Act to
fences on private lands.
In Mackay v. Uinta Development Co." the 8th Circuit
found that the Act conferred the right in question. The plaintiff was the owner of all the odd-numbered sections in an unenclosed strip of land separating the defendant's summer and
winter ranges. When the defendant drove his sheep across
this strip in transferring them from one range to the other the
plaintiff had him arrested for trespass and brought an action
for damages. The court held the Act could be raised by an individual as a defense in a trespass action and concluded:
35. United States v. Douglas-Willan Sartoris Co., 3 Wyo. 287, 22 P. 92, 97
(1889).
36. United States v. Buford, supra note 31.
37. 219 F. 116 (8th Cir. 1914).
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This statute has been construed to prohibit every
method that works a practical denial of access to and
passage over public lands...
...The question here, which we think should be answered in the affirmative, is whether Mackey [the
defendant] was entitled to a reasonable way of passage over the unenclosed tract of land without being
guilty of trespass."'
Subsequent decisions by the 8th Circuit have reaffirmed this
position." Relying on the interpretation given the Act by the
8th Circuit the Supreme Court of New Mexico reached a similar conclusion." Interestingly, these decisions all avoid discussing the constitutional basis for such a construction.
Also without discussing any constitutional questions one
United States District Court concluded the Act provides no
way over private lands. Its rationale was that if Congress had
intended that result it would have expressly indicated its
intent.4 2
One can only speculate as to how the United States Supreme Court would rule if faced squarely with a determination of whether the Act confers a right of way across private
lands when necessary to reach the public domain. The Camfield Court carefully avoided any discussion of this problem
or the use of any legal theories which would have demanded a
later holding that the right exists. By relying on nuisance
principles, and admitting the defendant could have excluded
the public if his fences had been effective for enclosing his own
land the Court seemed to suggest that no such right was
granted by the Act.
The element of intent seems completely incompatible with
the right to cross private land. If the Act confers the right
then it is equally denied whether or not the intervening owner
builds a fence with intention to deny it. Thus, if Camfield is
38. Id. at 119.
39. Id. at 120.
40. Western Wyoming Land and Live Stock Co. v. Bagley, 279 F. 632 (8th Cir.
1922); Mumford v. Rock Springs Grazing Assn., 261 F. 842 (8th Cir. 1919).
41. Jastro v. Francis, 172 P. 1139, 1142 (N.M. 1918).
42. United States v. Rindge, supra note 34.
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read as prohibiting only those fences built on private lands
with the intent to enclose public lands, it necessarily follows
that the Court did not interpret the Act as conferring the
right to cross private land. Significantly, those courts which
have found in favor of such a right have also found that any
device which is effective for denying access is unlawful, regardless of the intent with which it is built.
On the other hand, Camfield contains no statement which
absolutely precludes a finding that the right exists. If one
adopts the position that the destruction of the fence without
the attendant right to cross the private land is meaningless,
then Camfield must confer that right. In the final analysis,
it seems the Court purposely made its decisions somewhat ambiguous, thereby giving it complete freedom to rule either for
or against the right to cross private land where a later case
required that decision.
Perhaps it should be noted that all those decisions which
expressly found that the Act conferred a right to cross private land involved checkerboard lands. In such a situation for
either party to reach his lands necessitates crossing at least
some small portion of the other's land. As the court in Mackay
v. Uinta Development Co.43 noted, a private owner who demands that the public not cross any of his lands is attempting
to cast all of the disadvantages of the interlocking pattern of
ownership on the government. In requiring that he grant the
public the same rights he enjoys, the courts are merely demanding equitable treatment. It seems likely that these courts
ignored constitutional considerations to reach what they considered to be a just result. Whatever their basis, they do
represent a persuasive case for the right to cross the privately
owned sections of checkerboard lands in order to reach the
public sections. Their persuasiveness in noncbeckerboard
situations is not so great.
The Act should not be forgotten even if one concludes
that it confers no right to cross private land under any circumstance. There are various situations in which a person
43. Supra note 37.
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may be excluded from entering public lands where the difficulty is not with intervening private lands. In addition to
the instance where an individual makes a naked claim on
public lands, difficulties can arise under the regulations of
the various land administering agencies. For example, both
the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management allow grazing permitees to construct fences and other range
improvements on public lands."' However, these improvements do not convey the right to exclusive use of the land influenced,"5 nor can the permitee interfere with the use of the
land by hunters, fisherman and others who have a right to use
it.4" Thus, it is entirely possible to have a situation where a
permitee is authorized to build a fence on public lands, and the
public is authorized to enter upon and use the same lands.
When a member of the public is unlawfully excluded from
such lands by locked gates, no trespassing signs, or intimidation the Act provides an obviously desirable remedy. All a
citizen need do is file an affidavit with the appropriate
United States Attorney, the expense of investigation and litigation then falling on the Government. The Act is designed
to provide for a prompt hearing of the case and the penalties
are sufficient to discourage further violations. While there
are apparently no reported decisions in which the Act was
used in these circumstances, there are no apparent reasons
why it could not be.
EASEMENTS

By

NECESSITY

The most promising of common law theories on which to
base a right to cross private land to reach public land would
appear to be that of an easement by necessity. The typical
easement arises when a pers ,n conveys a portion of his land
in such a manner that it is iipossible to reach the portion conveyed without crossing thde part retained, or vice versa. Since
it would be impossible to use the land conveyed (or retained)
44.

43 C.F.R. 4125.1-4 (1972) and 36 C.F.R. 231.9(a) (1972) authorize the
making of range improvements. 43 C.F.R. 4112.3-1(c) (1972) and 36 C.F.R.
261.11(b) (1972) prohibit such structures except when authorized.

45. 36 C.F.R. 231.9(b)(4)

(1972).

46. 43 C.F.R. 4125.1-1(i) (10)

(1972); 43 C.F.R. 4112.3-1(g)
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the law finds an easement based on the presumed or implied
intent of the parties to the conveyance. 7
Whether an easement by necessity can exist where public
lands are involved is a subject of controversy. In 1848 the
Supreme Court of Missouri found that the easement could
exist. It stated:
The United States being the proprietor of a section
of land, entirely surrounded by other sections, sells
the land so surrounded; the purchaser acquires by
common law, a right of way to the land he has bought,
as necessary incident of the grant. The case is not
altered by selling the surrounding land to different
individuals. The purchasers take it subject to the
burden imposed on it whilst it belonged to the government, the original proprietor.4
Since the court indicated that ways of necessity could be applied in favor of the grantor as well as the grantee, there would
appear to be no reason why the result would not have been
the same if it had been the United States seeking an easement
to sections of land which it had retained.
Several decisions involving the checkerboard design have
reached similar conclusions. In United States v. Buford4 9 the
Supreme Court of Utah stated that even had there been no
Unlawful Enclosure of Public Lands Act"0 the landowner of
the odd-numbered sections could not have fenced the land so
as to exclude the public from the even-numbered sections. The
court held that in making the grants to the railroads Congress
had, by implication, reserved the right of free access to the
public sections. A Montana Court 1 concluded that the easement existed not only in favor of the Government, but also in
47. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476, comment g (1944).

48. Snyder v. Warford & Thomas, 11 Mo. 513, 514 (1848). A similar expression
was made by a dissenting judge in Crear v. Crossly, 40 Ill. 175, 178 (1868).
Both cases involved the constitutionality of statutes providing for the establishment of private rights of way by condemnation. The Snyder court
and the dissenting judge in the Crear case justified the statutes on the
bases that such rights already existed and the statutes merely regulated the
method of their exercise.
49. Supra note 31, at 434.
50. Act of Feb. 25, 1885, ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321-22, as amended 43 U.S.C. §§ 106166 (1970).
51.

Herrin v. Sieben, 46 Mont. 226, 127 P. 323, 328 (1912).
Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328 (1925).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss1/5
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favor of private citizens who wished to enter for lawful purposes. Although finding against the defendant because his
sheep had completely depastured the plaintiff's land, one
federal court nevertheless concluded that an easement to reach
the even-numbered sections existed in favor of the public."
Pearnev. Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing Co."3 is
the leading case adopting the opposite view. That court refused to find an easement of necessity where state land grants
were concerned primarily because it felt that such a finding
required the conclusion that every grantee from the state
would have a right of way over all surrounding lands held by
junior grantees to the limits of the state. While this probably
overstates the practical effect of such a doctrine, it is precisely
this sort of reasoning which has led other courts to refuse to
apply the doctrine where unity of title can be found only in
the sovereign."
Those cases allowing the easement are primarily cases
dealing with checkerboard lands. This suggests that perhaps
the difference in result can be explained by the difference in
the physical situation. A deeper examination of the doctrine
of easements by necessity lends further strength to this suggestion.
As was discussed previously, an easement by necessity is
a form of implied easement. Implied easements arise out of the
intent inferred by the circumstance of the conveyance, rather
than the language used.5 This may result in ascribing an intention to the parties which they did not have, but would have
had had they foreseen the problem." In effect the search is
for objective intent; that is, the presumed intent of a reasonable grantee and grantor in similar circumstances. The reason for the inference in the case of "necessity" is obvious: If
one of the parties to a conveyance can reach his land only by
crossing the other party's land, the parties probably intended
52. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cunningham, 89 F. 594, 595 (D. Wash. 1898).
53. 90 Tenn. 669, 18 S.W. 402, 404 (1891).
54. United States v. Rindge, supra note 34, at 619; State v. Black Bros., 116
Tex. 615, 297 S.W. 213, 219 (1927). See also Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923, 929 (Tex. 1964).
55. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476, comment a (1944).
56. Id.; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.33 (Casner ed. 1952).
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for him to have that right. Obviously the necessity must exist
at the time of the conveyance. 7 If it arises later it is certainly
not useful in inferring the intent of the parties at the time of
conveyance.
In the case of the checkerboard pattern it is apparent
that the grantor (United States) and grantee must cross each
others land to reach their own. Furthermore, the need to do so
clearly arose at the time of the conveyance. Thus, it does not
seem unreasonable to conclude that their objective intent was
for the United States to retain an easement to cross the private sections in order to reach the public sections.
Easements to reach noncheckerboard lands present a
more difficult problem. Since the grants leading to the problem were made on an individual basis it is difficult to demonstrate any "objective intent" or "necessity" to retain an easement to reach the remaining public lands. Certainly when the
first patent was issued in a sea of public domain no necessity
to cross that tract to reach the remaining public land existed.
These requirements can perhaps be satisfied with respect to
the grant which completed an enclosure, but limiting the application of the doctrine to that grant greatly diminishes its
usefulness.
While the case law in favor of easement by necessity to
reach checkerboard lands is substantial, there are cases which
would appear to favor an opposite result. Although it did not
expressly overrule them, the Supreme Court of Wyoming obviously disfavored them in United States v. Douglas-Willan
Sartoris Co. 8 It did so on the basis of the legal adage that a
grant is to be construed strictly against the grantor. Congress,
being the grantor, should have expressly reserved easements
to reach the even-numbered sections if it desired to have access
to them. Futhermore, the United States Supreme Court refused to use the opportunity presented by Camfield v. United
States" to declare that such an easement existed.
57. United States v. Rindge, supra note 34, at 622.
58. Supra note 35, at 297, 22 P. at 96.
59. Supra note 24.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss1/5

14

Gould: Access to Public Lands Across Intervening Private Lands

1973

COMMENT

There are several other problems worthy of brief consideration. In United States v. Rindge ° the United States was
not permitted to establish an easement by necessity for public
use, partly on the basis that such ways are strictly private and
cannot be exercised in favor of the general public. This conclusion limits easements of necessity to reach public lands to
those which run in favor of the government in a strictly proprietary sense. In other words, if such an easement exists,
it exists only in favor of one who enters as an agent of the
United States. In contradiction to this attitude, several of the
checkerboard opinions held that the easement exised in favor
of every member of the public and could be raised as a defense
to a trespass action."1
State v. Black Brothers6 2 demonstrates a further problem
whenever the state or federal government attempts to establish
an easement by necessity. The Texas court ruled that since
the state could always acquire an easement by eminent domain
there could be no necessity from which to presume the reservation of an easement.
In conclusion, it appears that a respectable, although not
overwhelming, case can be made for easements of necessity in
the checkerboard situation. In other situations the case is a
good deal less sound.
PUBLIC USER
Another category of common law remedies which may be
useful in gaining access to enclosed public lands are rights acquired by public user. There are several different concepts
involved here but, as the title implies, the common characteristic is previous use by the public. Specifically the concepts
are custom, prescription, and implied dedication. Because
all these concepts rely on prior use by the public, their utility
may be limited. Nevertheless, there may be situations where
they are applicable. Furthermore, recent cases involving
60. Supra note 34, at 618-19.
61. Herrin v. Sieben, supra note 51; Herrin v. Sutherland, supra note 51; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cunningham, supra note 52.
62. Supra note 54, at 218.
63. For another discussion of this topic see Comment, The Acquisition of Easements by the Public Through Use, 16 So. DAK. L. Rav. 150 (1971).
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custom and implied dedication are worth examining for the
insight they provide to the reaction of courts confronted with
the exploding demand for recreational space.
Custom
Custom is defined as:
A usage or practice of the people, which, by common
adoption and acquiescence and by long and unvarying
habit, has become compulsory, and has acquired the
force of a law with respect to the place or subjectmatter to which it relates. 4
Blackstone listed seven requirements necessary to give rise to
a customary right. 5 As applied to land, the concept is that
persons of a certain locality or class have, by immemorial custom, a right to use the lands of a private person."6 Custom
has received little acceptance in the United States, and until
recently only New Hampshire had ever utilized it.67
In 1969 the Supreme Court of Oregon made use of the
doctrine in State ex rel Thornton v. Hay6" to insure that the
dry sand area" of Oregon's beaches would remain open to the
public. The state brought an action to enjoin the defendants
from building a fence across the dry sand area. The trial
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 461 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
(5th ed.

65.

1 BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 76-78.

66.
67.

1773). The following is a paraphrase of the requirements:
1. The custom must have been in existence so long that the memory
of man runneth not to the contrary.
2. The custom must have continued without interruption. This
does not require continuous exercise of the customs, but does
require that the custom itself has not been interrupted.
3. The custom must have been peaceful and not subject to dispute.
4. The custom must be reasonable.
5. The custom ought to be certain.
6. The custom, though consentual, must be obligatory and not left
to the option of each person.
7. The custom must be consistent with other customs.
3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 934 (3rd ed. 1939).
2 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 369, at 463 (repl. ed. 1961); see Perley v.
Langley, 7 N.H. 233 (1834); Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387 (1851). Hawaii
has also used customs but its land laws are based on ancient tradition,
customs, practice, and usage. Application of Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 440
P.2d 76, 77 (1968).
254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
The dry-sand area is generally described as that portion of the beach between the line of mean high tide and the visible vegetation line. Id. at 672,
673. There was no dispute in Thornton as to the area between mean high
tide and extreme low tide as that area was, by statute, designated as a state
recreation area. ORE. REV. STAT. 390.615 (1971). For a more thorough
discussion of the problems of seaward boundaries of littoral lands see
Borox Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).

68.
69.
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court granted the injunction basing its decision on implied
dedication and prescription. The Supreme Court affirmed
but preferred to rely on custom. A decision based on dedication or prescription could only be applied to the lands presently
before the court, whereas "[a]n established custom, on the
other hand, can be proven with reference to a larger region.
Ocean-front land from the northern to the southern boundary
of the state ought to be treated uniformly.' "'
The court compared Blackstone's requirements to the
present situation and found them satisfied in all regards. Two
objections had been raised to the use of custom. The first was
that there was little precedent for its use in the United States
and none in Oregon. The second was that the brevity of Oregon's political history made it impossible to satisfy the requirement of an ancient use. In answer to the first objection,o
the court cited the New Hampshire case of Perley v. Langley 1
and added that precedent was not necessary anyway. The second objection was countered by saying that brevity should not
militate against custom when custom did in fact exist. Furthermore the court said, "[I]f antiquity were the sole test
of the validity of custom, Oregonians could satisfy that requirement by recalling that the European settlers were not
the first people to use the dry sand area as public land."I 2
Custom probably has little value in most situations where
public access is a problem. However, the Thornton decision
is an excellent example of the adroitness of a court in molding
an existing remedy to include a new situation when it feels
this is desirable. In addition to circumventing the requirement of an ancient use, on which most American courts had
stumbled, the Oregon court greatly expanded the physical
limits usually associated with customary rights; that is, limitation to either the inhabitants of a specific village or locality,
or to a particuflar class of people. 3 For all practical purposes
the court opened Oregon's beaches to the entire world. Fur70. Supra note 68, at 676.
71.

7 N.H. 233 (1834).

72. Supra note 68, at 678.
73. Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. 425, 431 (N.Y. Ct. Err, 1839) ; GRAY, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUTIES §§ 573, 577 (4th ed. 1942); 6 POWELL, REAL PROP934 n.5 (1971); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 935 (3rd ed. 1939).
ERTY
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thermore, the court ignored the effect of a 1935 United States
Supreme Court decision"4 which held that a federal patent
conveys title to the mean high tide line. Regardless of the
rhetoric used, the decision amounted to a declaration that
lands which the United States Supreme Court had previously
said were private property were now to be considered public
property. It is apparent that the Oregon court was breaking
new ground in its application of custom to this situation. Its
willingness to do so is perhaps a bellweather.
It should be noted that the decision did not completely
solve the problem of making Oregon's beaches available for
public use. While the decision prevents the construction of
obstacles to lateral travel along a beach, it has no application
when seeking a route across intervening private land. However, the court did not reject implied dedication or public
easements by prescription and, in fact, indicated that both
doctrines have sound judicial and statutory support in Oregon.
Having demonstrated that it believes public policy requires
free use of Oregon's beaches by the public, it seems possible
that the court would not hesitate to apply these doctrines to
secure access to its beaches.
Prescription and Implied Dedication
Dedication of land to a public use can be implied by circumstances other than use by the public. However, it is this
type of circumstance that is most likely to be useful in gaining
access to public land. Therefore, this discussion will be limited
to that manner of dedication. When so limited, implied dedication is very similar to the creation of public easements by
prescription. For this reason the two concepts will be considered together.
In theory the function performed by the public use in
each concept is somewhat different. Prescription, as applied
by most American jurisdictions, is highly analogous to adverse
possession.7" The effect of this analogy is to make the intent
74. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 23 (1935).
75.

2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.52 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 THOMPSON, REAL
PROPERTY § 337, at 180 (repl. ed. 1961).
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of the owner of the land immaterial. If he allows another to
use his land in a particular way7" for a sufficient time,"' he
loses the right to demand otherwise. Where dedication is concerned, use by the public can perform two functions: to show
the intent of the owner to appropriate the land to a public
use78 or to demonstrate acceptance of the dedication by the
public.7 9
Because of the different functions performed by the public
user, it is possible to have dedication without prescription
or vice versa. However, the courts have often confused the
two concepts, and it is difficult to find any significant differences in certain situations. The California decisions are a
good example. In that state adverse use of private land by the
public for five years or more gives rise to a conclusive presumption of intent to dedicate."0 Evidence of the owner's actual intent is no longer relevant. Differences between this
form of dedication and prescription are not apparent. In fact,
dedication implied by adverse user has been justified by
analogizing it to prescription."' The aversion of California
courts to the term prescription where the public is involved
was explained by an early court as follows:
"Prescription" is not a term strictly applicable to
a right acquired by the public by the use of a way for
any period of time. The law allows prescription only
to supply the place of grants, and, inasmuch as the
public cannot take by grant, the term "prescription,"
in its strict sense, has no application to highways.
The true doctrine would seem to be that immemorial
use by the public is evidence of a dedication, just as
such8 2use by an individual is evidence of a grant to
]in.

76. It is generally said that the use must be adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 457 (1944).
77. Because of the analogy to adverse possession the required period of use is
usually the same as that required by the states on adverse possession. 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.52 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT OF

PROPERTY § 460, comment (a) (1944); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1191,
at 545-46 (3rd ed. 1939).
78. Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, supra note 54, at 936. Diamond Match Co.
v. Savercool, 218 Cal. 665, 24 P.2d 783, 784 (1933).
79. Collins v. Zander, 61 So. 2d 897, 899 (La. 1952); Wolfe v. Kemler, 228 Ia.
733, 293 N.W. 322, 324 (1940).
80. Union Transp. Co. v. Sacramento County, 42 Cal. 2d 443, 267 P.2d 10, 13
(1954); Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 108 Cal. 589, 41 P.448, 449 (1895).
81.

Schwerdtle v. Placer County, supra note 80.

82. Bolger v. Foss, 65 Cal. 250, 3 P.871, 871 (1884).
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California recognizes that lesser degrees of use may, when
coupled with other appropriate facts, result in implied dedication. Thus, what California has essentially done is to include prescriptive easements by public user within the doctrine of dedication. California is not alone in its dislike of the
word prescription where public ways are involved and, like
California, most states which have rejected the concept have
achieved the same result by dedication. 8
A more detailed discussion of these doctrines will not be
undertaken for several reasons. Both are relatively well established, and numerous discussions can be found elsewhere.84
Although well established, many local nuances exist and the
decisions of a particular jurisdiction must be consulted to
arrive at any accurate conclusions. Furthermore, with the
two exceptions discussed below, there is nothing unusual about
the application of these concepts to gain access to public lands.
The first difficulty a private citizen may encounter in
seeking to enforce a public easement is a lack of standing to
maintain the suit. Essentially, such a person is seeking to
abate a public nuisance. The nuisance to be abated is an obstruction of a public way, an essential element of the case being
proof that the way is in fact public.8 8
Whether or not they talk in terms of a public nuisance, it
is clear that most courts regard the right as a public one which
can be enforced by a private citizen only if he can show a
special injury.8" A special injury is one which differs in
kind, rather than degree, from th4t experienced by other mem83.

2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.50 (Casner ed. 1952).
84. Discussions of the creations of public ways by prescription can be found
in: 2 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.50(e) (Casner ed. 1952); 2 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 342 (repl. ed. 1961); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§§ 1211-1218 (3rd ed. 1939). Discussions on implied dedications can be
found in: 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 12.132-34 (Casner ed. 1952);
4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1098-1113 (3rd ed. 1939); 6 PowsLL, REAL
PROPERTY §§ 934-36 (1971); 23 AM. JuR. 2d Dedication §§ 28-31 (1965); 26
C.J.S. Dedication §§ 15-25 (1956).
85. See Irwin v. Dixin, 18 U.S. (9 How.) 6 (1849).
86. Halpenny v. City of San Antonio, 351 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1961); 23 AM. JUR.
2d Dedication § 70 (1965); 39 AM. JuR. 2d Highways, Street, and Bridges
§ 311 (1968).
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bers of the public.8" The problem of special injury becomes
especially acute where public lands are concerned as is demonstrated by Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co. v. Mcllquam.
The plaintiff alleged the defendant was attempting to assert
exclusive possession over public lands. The court in denying
the ability of the plaintiff to enjoin the defendants conduct
said:
But the injury or damage, if any, resulting to the
plaintiff from the unauthorized or illegal assertion
of the right to the exclusive possession of the public
lands on the part of the defendant would be suffered,
not alone by the plaintiff, but by all alike whose
livestock graze in that locality, or who seek to enjoy
the pasturage afforded by the grasses upon such public lands. The injury, in other words, would be an injury to the public, and, if a nuisance at all, a public
nuisance, somewhat like the obstruction of a highway or the interference with the public travel theron.
And it is an elementary principle that private persons, seeking the aid of equity to restrain a public
nuisance must show some special injury peculiar to
themselves, aside from and independent of the general injury to the public.89
The plight of a sportsman seeking to object to the barricading of a road leading to public lands is much the same. If
he were owner of the land he seeks to reach, he could show injuries peculiar to himself and maintain the suit."0 Since the
land is public, his right to use it for recreational purposes, like
the right of the plaintiff to graze cattle in the McIlquam case,
is no different from that of any member of the public. Consequently, his injury is not peculiar to himself when that right
is abridged.
87. PROSSER, TORTS, § 88, at 586-87 (4th ed. 1971). For a general discussion of
this problem of private remedies for public nuisances see: Prosser, Private
Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. Rsv. 997 (1966). For a discussion of
the problems of showing a special injury when obstruction of a public road
is involved see: Smith, Private Action for Obstruction of Public Right of
Passage (pts. 1 & 2), 15 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 142 (1915).
88. 14 Wyo. 209, 83 P. 364 (1905).
89. Id. at 370-71.
90. Strong v. Sullivan, 180 Cal. 331, 181 P. 59, 60 (1919); Morgan County v.
Goans, 138 Tenn. 381, 198 S.W. 69, 70 (1917) ; PROSSER, supra, note 87, at
589.
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The area of standing is presently undergoing considerable
change. However, one should not be lulled into a false sense
of optimism by cases like Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC1 This case and others like it have relied on
statutory authority in finding a private person had the right
to sue. Several states have also enacted statutes which give
a citizen the right to bring suit to abate a public nuisance.
Professor Prosser states that absent such authority there are
no cases which have held a private citizen had standing to
abate a public nuisance without a showing of special damages.2 Of course a public official can always bring the suit,
but this is a dubious remedy at best.
The fact that an easement is to be used to reach public
lands may have a significant effect on the attitude with which
a court approaches the problem. If there is a strong policy
that public lands are to remain accessible to the public the
court may require only a minimal showing to find the existence of an easement.
The influence of public policy was clearly evident in a
1970 California decision. The opinion was the consolidation
of two cases, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz and Dietz v. King,
both involving the use of privately owned beaches, and the
approaches thereto, by the public for a considerable time. The
Court did not deny that its finding of dedication in both cases
was an extension of California law in at least one respect: the
application of implied dedication to open areas such as
beaches. In support of its conclusion, the court cited Article
XV, Section 2 of the California Constitution, which provides
that no person shall be permitted to exclude the right of way
91. 354 F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965).
92. PROSSER, supra note 87, at 587 n.68.
93. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1970). For articles written specifically on this decision see: 7 CALIF. W. L.
REv. 259 (1970); 7 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 605 (1970); 11 SANTA CLARA LAW.
327 (1971); 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1092 (1971); 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 795 (1971).
It is interesting to note that the Dietz case was an action brought by the
plaintiffs as representatives for the public. The action was brought under
Section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure which is a provision
dealing with joinder and representative actions similar to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A brief search reveals no other case
where this section has been used to confer standing to represent the public
in general. Strangely this issue was not discussed in the principal opinions
nor in the opinion of the intermediate court. Dietz v. King. 80 Cal. Rptr.
234 (1969). It seems that this is one case where a private person succeeded
in abating a public nuisance without showing special injury.
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to any navigable waters when it is needed for a public purpose; Section 830 of the California Civil Code which has been
interpreted to state a presumption in favor of public ownership of land between high and low tide; and six other statutes
it felt indicated a strong public policy in favor of public acM In conclusion the court stated:
cess to the coast."
This court has in the past been less receptive to arguments of implied dedication when open beach lands
were involved than when well-defined roadways were
at issue .... (Citations omitted) With the increased
urbanization of the state, however, beach areas are
now as well defined as roadways. This intensification of land use combined with the clear public policy
in favor of encouraging and expanding public access
to and use of shoreline areas leads us to the conclusion that courts of this state must be as receptive to
a finding of implied dedication of shoreline areas as
they are to a finding of implied dedication of road(Citations omitted)"
ways ....
This decision and the Oregon decision on custom demonstrate the problems which coastal states are encountering with
respect to their beaches. Similar problems will no doubt be
encountered with other public lands. When public pressure
becomes sufficiently great, it is likely that other extensions
of the law will occur.
CONCLUSION

It is obvious that the statutes and common law theories
examined provide no general right to cross private lands to
reach the public domain. However, when one considers the
California and Oregon beach experiences, it is not inconceivable that the existence of such a right could be declared at
some time in the future. At the very least, the concepts examined should provide useful remedies in particular situations.
Certainly the Unlawful Enclosure of Public Lands Act ought
to be useful if one is excluded fom accessible public lands by
unlawful means. Likewise, the concepts of dedication and
94. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, supra note 93, at 59.
95. Id.
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prescription are viable remedies when the necessary factual
situation presents itself.
As was stated in the introduction the purpose of this comment is not to determine if a right of way across private land
to reach public land ought to exist, but rather to determine if
it does exist. No detailed examination of the desirability of
the right will be made here. However, a few observations seem
appropriate.
A court desiring to provide for access should be extremely
careful of the method by which it reaches its result. For
example, the Gion-Dietz decision has been counterproductive.
Beaches that were previously open to the public have now been
closed out of fear that continued use will lead to a declaration
that they are public beaches." It is doubtful that the owners
can now terminate the public's right if adverse public use
previously existed for more than five years. However, it will
take litigation in each case to reopen the beaches. In the meantime they remain closed. Furthermore, since the opinion was
unclear as to how a landowner can allow the public to use his
beach and yet avoid dedication, it seems likely that those persons who might otherwise allow public use will be hesitant to
do so.
On a gut level both prescription and implied-dedication
seem somewhat unfair. In effect they penalize the generous
landowner and reward the niggardly one. In terms of result
and, possibly in terms of fairness the Oregon approach is
preferable to that of California. On the other hand, the Oregon approach ignores the effect on those who have already
erected substantial obstacles, such as buildings, on the dry
sand area.
It is questionable whether the courts are the proper body
to resolve this problem. As the volume of reports generated by
the Public Land Law Review Commission attests, access is
only one of many problems associated with the public domain.
These problems are interrelated and a proper resolution requires that many diverse interests be considered. Courts are
96. 44 S.

CALL.

REV. 1092, 1094-95 (1971).
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not particularly well suited to this type of examination, and
often lack the power or means to effectively resolve the problem even when the solution is clear. The problem is one that
should be resolved by the legislative branch, where conflicting
considerations of public policy can be properly weighed.
The Public Land Law Review Commission has proposed
such state and federal governmental action as increased
budgetary support for the acquisition of rights of way and the
requirement of reciprocal rights of way where the private
landowner holds privileges to use public lands. 7 There is one
essential to this approach: money. The Bureau of Land
Management estimates that it would need $1.6 billion to complete an adequate system of roads and trails. At present the
average annual expenditure is $1 million for this purpose. 8
At this rate, the solution is only 1,600 years away! In the
meantime the courts will have to struggle with the problem.
GEORGE A.

GOULD

97. PUBLIC LAND LAW REviEW COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 214. A discussion
of the laws and regulation which the federal land administering agencies
presently follow with regard to access can be found in 1 HERMAN D. RUTH &
ASSOCIATES, OUTDOOR RECREATION USE OF THE PUBLIC LANDS 11-142 to 156
(Public Land Law Review Commission Report 1969).
98. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, PUBLIC ACCESS TO PUBuC DOMAIN LANDS 7
(Economic Research Service Miscellaneous Publication No. 1122 1968).
Admittedly this figure also includes the costs of development of roads and
trails on the public domain as well as the cost of adequate access roads to it.
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